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WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
 
Volume 34 2012 Number 2
 
SYMPOSIUM:
 
RADICAL NEMESIS: RE-ENVI­
SIONING IVAN ILLICH’S THEO­
RIES ON SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
 
FOREWORD 
JENNIFER L. LEVI* 
My dear friend and colleague, Shannon Minter,1 first intro­
duced me to Ivan Illich’s works.  In conversation after conversation, 
I found myself engaged with Shannon trying to deeply understand 
the political (and sometimes religious) right wing’s objection to 
equal marriage rights for same-sex couples.2  At the same time, 
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. 
1. Shannon Minter is the Legal Director of the National Center for Lesbian 
Rights (NCLR), one of the nation’s leading advocacy organizations for lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender people.  Shannon was lead counsel for same-sex couples in 
the landmark California marriage equality case, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 
(Cal. 2008), which held that same-sex couples have the fundamental right to marry and 
that laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation are inherently discriminatory 
and subject to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny.  Shannon was also NCLR’s 
lead attorney on Sharon Smith’s groundbreaking wrongful death suit and has litigated 
many other impact cases in California and across the country.  Shannon serves on the 
boards of Faith in America and the Transgender Law & Policy Institute. The Western 
New England University School of Law was honored to welcome Shannon to speak at 
the April 2011 Symposium, Radical Nemesis: Re-Envisioning Ivan Illich’s Theories on 
Social Institutions.  For more information about Shannon Minter see Shannon Price 
Minter, NAT’L  CENTER FOR  LESBIAN  RTS., http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer? 
pagename=About_Staff_ShannonMinter (last visited May 24, 2012). 
2. See e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 541, 565-72 (1985) (relying on a sectarian vision of general family 
values to denounce same sex marriage, stating that “[t]he majority [of society] . . . may 
341 
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342 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:341 
both Shannon and I often found ourselves in the cross-hairs of the 
transgender community’s critique of essentialist views of gender, 
often pitting transsexual transgender people, of which I am not, 
against transgender people, of which I am.3  That the critique came 
reasonably believe that legal recognition of same-sex marriage . . . would impair the 
ability of opposite-sex marriage to advance the individual and community values that it 
has traditionally promoted”); Teresa Stanton Collett, Constitutional Confusion: The 
Case for the  Minnesota Marriage Amendment, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1029, 1048 
(2007) (“Civil marriage should be recognized as only the union of one man and one 
woman.  Only the union of a man and a woman may involve the unique physical act 
from which children are created, and children best flourish when raised by their biologi­
cal mother and father who are united in marriage.”) (citations omitted); George W. 
Dent, Jr., Straight is Better: Why Law and Society May Justly Prefer Heterosexuality, 15 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 359, 436 (2011) (“Homosexuals—and all people—should be 
treated with decency and civility, but not all behavior merits equal respect.”).  Professor 
Dent also relies on a societal justification in his opposition to same-sex marriage, stat­
ing: “Traditional marriage and the biological family . . . benefit society by making adults 
better and more productive citizens and by providing the best upbringing for their chil­
dren.  When a husband and wife bear and raise children they are not merely effecting 
[sic] their personal lifestyle preference; they are helping to ensure the future of our 
society.” Id. at 435-36.  Sherif Girgis et al., What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 245, 276 (2011) (“Public institutions shape our ideas, and ideas have conse­
quences; so removing the rational basis for a norm will erode adherence to that norm— 
if not immediately, then over time.”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the 
Union of a Man and a Woman, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1377 (2007) (“When same-sex 
marriage is legalized, the moral qualities and characteristics of homosexual relations 
and lifestyles will become part of the institution of marriage, and will have some trans-
formative effect upon the qualities and characteristics of the institution of conjugal mar­
riage.  Modification of marriage to make it more like gay-relations will cause serious 
harm to society, families, and individuals.”). 
3. Members of the transgender community frequently critique the medicalization 
of trans identity, criticizing the reliance on arbitrary, subjective criteria and the 
gatekeeping role of the medical providers.  For example, Dean Spade challenges reli­
ance on the DSM (The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) as a 
measure for supposed “expert” physicians to provide or deny a GID (Gender Identity 
Disorder) diagnosis and gender confirming medical treatment.  Dean Spade, Law as 
Tactics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 442, 450 (2011) [hereinafter Spade, Law as Tac­
tics].  According to Spade, the structure of the “arrangement[ ] result[s] in the enforce­
ment of rigid gender norms on trans bodies” as doctors often require performance of 
these expected norms. Id. at 451.  Ultimately, “[t]hose who fail to meet the arbitrary, 
subjective criteria of their medical providers are frequently denied access to care.” Id.; 
see also Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S 
L.J. 15, 25 (2003) [hereinafter Spade, Resisting Medicine] (criticizing the medical model 
of transsexuality, noting that it “separat[es] . . . gender from cultural forces”). To 
demonstrate the “immediate error and danger” the medical model creates, Spade 
explains: 
The diagnostic criteria for GID [Gender Identity Disorder] produces a fiction 
of natural gender in which normal, non-transsexual people grow up with mini­
mal to no gender trouble or exploration, do not cross-dress as children, do not 
play with the wrong gendered kids, and do not like the wrong kinds of toys or 
characters. This story is not believable.  Yet, it survives because medicine pro­
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343 2012] FOREWORD 
from within the transgender community and served to divide natu­
ral allies, was all the more striking and, in my view, needless. 
Oddly, the criticism of my work relevant to the fabricated divide 
has often focused on my support for medical care and medical ac­
cess for transgender people, a position and a perspective that have 
become essential to serving the most basic medical needs of trans-
gender people.4  Because of embracing that so-called medicaliza­
tion of identity, I have found myself sometimes criticized for that 
approach’s perceived rejection of a completely fluid, socio-contex­
tual understanding of gender. 
Perhaps because I do think that gender has meaning beyond its 
socio-cultural significance,5 meaning that infuses individual behav­
duces it not through a description of the norm, but through a generalized ac­
count of the norm’s transgression by gender deviants. 
Id. See generally Pooja S. Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, Unraveling Injustice: Race and Class 
Impact of Medicaid Exclusions of Transition-Related Health Care for Transgender Peo­
ple, 4 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 7 (2007) (considering Medicaid policies that ex­
clude and/or limit coverage for transition-related health care for transgender people 
and demonstrating that these disproportionate policies reproduce hierarchies of race 
and class). 
4. Dean Spade has observed that 
[m]any advocates on both sides of the debate engage both a critical disability 
studies framework, understanding disability as constructed by societal barriers 
to participation rather than stemming naturally from impairment, and also 
generally engage a feminist theorization of trans identity that problematizes 
individualizing the ‘disorder’ to trans people rather than troubling the systems 
of gender assignment and enforced performance. 
Spade, Law as Tactics, supra note 3, at 452.  Implicit, however, in referencing this cur­
rent debate is the common belief that transgender people need medical care. Id. at 449­
56. See generally Judith Butler, Doing Justice to Someone: Sex Reassignment and Alle­
gories of Transsexuality, in UNDOING GENDER 58 (2004); Jeannie J. Chung, Identity or 
Condition? The Theory and Practice of Applying State Disability Laws to Transgender 
Individuals, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2011); Nick Gorton, Toward a Resolution of 
GID, the Model of Disease, and the Transgender Community, http://makezine.enough 
enough.org/giddiseasc.htm (last visited May 24, 2012); Alvin Lee, Trans Models in 
Prison: The Medicalization of Gender Identity and the Eighth Amendment Right to Sex 
Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447 (2008); Spade, Resisting 
Medicine, supra note 3. 
5. Cf. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
IDENTITY 25 (1990) (stating that all of gender is culturally determined).  Recognizing 
gender as “performative,” Butler explains, “there is no gender identity behind the ex­
pressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ 
that are said to be its results.” Id.; JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 232 (1993) 
(“Femininity is thus not the product of a choice, but the forcible citation of a norm, one 
whose complex historicity is indissociable from relations of discipline, regulation, pun­
ishment.”). See generally Julie A. Greenberg, The Roads Less Traveled: The Problem 
with Binary Sex Categories, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 51, 52 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 
2006) (considering how gender has been legally defined, and the view of gender as a 
social construct). 
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344 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:341 
ior as well as identity—adopting, in the most polarized terms, an 
essentialist view of gender—I can at some deep level imagine a 
world in which marriage and family could or should be defined in a 
restrictive way that is oriented around gendered roles and that its 
transformation from that more restrictive definition could centrally 
stretch or challenge its broad meaning.  At the same time, as a 
staunch defender of marriage equality, I really do not understand 
the right’s critique that conceives marriage as a zero-sum game di­
minished by the inclusion of committed, loving albeit same-sex 
couples.  Yet, because I also think gender (here meaning one’s in­
ternalized sense of who one is as male or female, often referred to 
as gender identity) is, for many people including myself, one of the 
most important, persistent and unchangeable elements of human 
identity, I also understand how the disruption of a gender-exclusive 
definition of marriage could be culturally and socially unsettling. 
It was in the midst of one of many of these conversations that 
Shannon and I had about these ideas that Shannon urged me to 
read Ivan Illich’s work, Gender.6 Gender, it turns out was not one 
of Illich’s more prominent works and, given its hostile reception by 
the feminist scholars7 in whose midst he was working at the time he 
6. IVAN ILLICH, GENDER (1982) [hereinafter ILLICH, GENDER]. 
7. In the summer of 1982, in the midst of a series of lectures, Ivan Illich spoke at 
Berkeley as a Regents Lecturer.  Following his lecture, feminist scholars from Berkley 
and abroad organized a symposium to demonstrate what they called the “feminist per­
spective” to Illich’s controversial assertions. See Symposium, Beyond the Backlash: A 
Feminist Critique of Ivan Illich’s Theory of Gender, 3 FEMINIST ISSUES 1 (Spring 1983). 
The scholars presented to nearly 500 onlookers, and although each presenter took a 
unique perspective in their critique, the “overall agreement” was noticed, particularly 
the “underlying feminist critique” which each participant shared.  Gloria Bowles, Intro­
duction: The Context, 3 FEMINIST ISSUES 1, 6 (Spring 1983).  In one critique, presenter 
Arlie Hochschild stated: 
He [Illich] is advocating a moral predisposition toward the world we live in; he 
is soliciting the female moral votes for ‘negative economic growth,’ for a re­
turn to the spirit of the seventeenth century, if not the eleventh. To make this 
voyage backward seem desirable, he paints a bleak and sterile picture of mod­
ern life: we’re interchangeable units who suffer from a scarcity of the life-
giving experiences that everyone enjoyed in the good old days of Vernacular 
Gender – things like savoring the smell of apple pie being baked in the Dalma­
tian kitchen of Illich’s own mother.  Scarcity, of course, like envy, came into 
the world when we abandoned the gender divide.  So [according to Illich] if we 
want fulfillment, we must give up our ‘vain’ pursuit of equality between the 
sexes. 
Arlie Hochschild, Illich: The Ideologue in Scientist’s Clothing, 3 FEMINIST ISSUES 6, 9-10 
(Spring 1983).  In response to Illich’s beliefs “decry[ing] discrimination against women 
as sexist,” yet, in the same turn, “disdain[ing] the notion of equality,” Lillian Rubin 
exclaims, “you confuse us, Mr. Illich.”  Lillian B. Rubin, On Gurus and Easy Solutions, 
3 FEMINIST ISSUES 11, 14 (Spring 1983).  Building on this clear frustration, Robin Lakoff 
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wrote the work, ought not to principally define his contributions. 
Given the breadth of his work, and the range of ideas that he has 
addressed it surely will not.  However, Gender bears mention in this 
foreword, if for no other reason than it led me to Illich which led 
Illich to the center of this Symposium which drew a wide range of 
scholars from across many different disciplines. 
The reason finding my way to Gender was so personally satis­
fying was because in it Illich offers an account of vernacular gender 
that retains what one might conventionally refer to as social and 
cultural gendered stereotypes that are, at the same time, deeply 
connected to personal identity and, perhaps more importantly, 
equally valued regardless of whether contributed by men or wo­
men.  In other words, the critiques of contemporary concepts of 
gender (in contrast to Illich’s description of gender prior to the rise 
of class-based economies) largely reveal that a central problem with 
gender is that it by definition values male gender and devalues fe­
male gender.8  Given that there is nothing inherently (meaning bio­
logically) superior about male gender, in contrast to female gender 
(to the contrary each is fully dependent on the other for its exis­
tence), contemporary academic accounts of socially constructed 
gender are near uniformly critical of it as any kind of organizing 
principle.  And yet, few would doubt that it remains a powerful one. 
For me, the beauty of Illich’s work is that it suggests the possi­
bility of gender as a benign organizing structure for culture and 
calls Illich a “propagandist” and criticizes Gender as being “intentionally unintel­
ligible.”  Robin Lakoff, Illich as Text, 3 FEMINIST ISSUES 15, 15 (Spring 1983) (“[A]ll the 
salient features of modern propaganda, as exemplified in classics of the genre, like Mein 
Kampf, are to be found in Gender – and are absent from scientific, or scholarly, 
texts.”).  In her conclusion, Gloria Bowles notes “there is something unclean about this 
modern age [for Illich]; he has absolutely no grasp of how exciting it is to be a woman in 
the modern age.”  Gloria Bowles, Conclusion: The Centrality of Women’s Studies, 3 
FEMINIST ISSUES 37, 40 (Spring 1983). 
8. See e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Ori­
entation: The Effeminate Man In The Law And Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 
1,18 (1995) (Among these “central themes that emerge from [an] interdisciplinary look 
at gender are . . . that gendered characteristics are often bundled; that what is seen as 
masculine is more highly valued than what is seen as feminine, at least in part because 
the latter is associated with women; that, in addition to being generally devalued, the 
feminine is viewed as completely unacceptable in males; and that a woman exhibiting 
masculine characteristics is today viewed, both descriptively and normatively, quite dif­
ferently from a man who exhibits feminine ones.”); Katherine Franke, The Central Mis­
take of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1995) (“In many cases, biology operates as the excuse or cover for social 
practices that hierarchize individual members of the social category ‘man’ over individ­
ual members of the social category ‘woman.’  In the end, biology or anatomy serve as 
metaphors for a kind of inferiority that characterizes society’s view of women.”). 
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346 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:341 
community—one that places equal value on the contribution of 
masculine and feminine people.9  Indeed, the absence of either 
would centrally dissolve the societal organizing structures.10  To be 
sure, in Illich’s view, the world in which gender matters rests on 
organizing structures that are eroded by and unsustainable with the 
rise of capitalism.  Notwithstanding, his historical and normative 
descriptions present the possibility of a world that appreciates and 
values gender—indeed is unsustainable without it—but that does 
not devolve into sexism run amok by intrinsically undermining the 
equally valued participation of women within its structure. 
But, alas, perhaps I digress.  The point being that one of Illich’s 
least-known and most hostilely received works, Gender, was my en­
try point to his ideas and writing. That introduction quickly re­
minded me, however, that I was familiar already with some of his 
more widely known works including, for example, Deschooling So­
ciety,11 and Medical Nemesis.12  Having been entranced by Gender, 
I was enticed to revisit the works with which I had already been 
9. In Gender, Illich argues that much of the unpaid shadow work is thrust onto 
women, noting “[t]o a greater extent and in a different manner from men, women were 
drafted into the economy. They were—and are—deprived of equal access to wage la­
bor only to be bound with even greater inequality to work that did not exist before 
wage labor came into being.” ILLICH, GENDER, supra note 6, at 46.  By way of example, 
Illich demonstrates the ways in which shadow work came into being: 
By introducing the term “shadow work,” I distinguish the procedure for cook­
ing eggs today from that followed in the past.  When a modern housewife goes 
to the market, picks up the eggs, drives them home in her car, takes the eleva­
tor to the seventh floor, turns on the stove, takes butter from the refrigerator, 
and fries the eggs, she adds value to the commodity with each one of these 
steps.  This is not what her grandmother did.  The latter looked for eggs in the 
chicken coop, cut a piece from the lard she had rendered, lit some wood her 
kids had gathered on the commons, and added the salt she had bought.  Al­
though this example might sound romantic, it should make the economic dif­
ference clear.  Both women prepare fried eggs, but only one uses a marketed 
commodity and highly capitalized production goods: car, elevator, electric 
appliances. 
Id. at 49.  Illich concludes, “[s]hadow work could not have come into existence before 
the household was turned into an apartment set up for the economic function of up­
grading value-deficient commodities.” Id. at 50. 
10. In Illich’s view, the contributions of men and women are essential precisely 
because only men can make the kind of contributions that males make and only women 
can make the kind of contributions that females make.  Unlike in the contemporary 
feminist world situated on capitalist designed money-based economies where men and 
women are equally competent to contribute to society (making one or the other fungi­
ble), in Illich’s view, neither the contributions of men nor women are fungible making 
each essential for survival.  By implication, female contributions become as essential as 
male contributions and vice versa. Id. at 67-68, 81. 
11. IVAN  ILLICH, DESCHOOLING  SOCIETY (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., Harper & 
Row 1971) [hereinafter ILLICH, DESCHOOLING]. 
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347 2012] FOREWORD 
familiar.  Like many an Illich follower, I dove in headlong. For a 
time, I could scarcely have a conversation in which I did not refer in 
some way to Illich or his works. Fortunately for me, most of my 
colleagues decided—for which I am grateful—not to abandon con­
versation with me but rather to start to engage Illich’s world of 
ideas as well.  Illich’s world of ideas is where this Symposium began 
and, like Illich’s life work, it drew in a range of academics and non-
academics alike all of whom thirst for the exchange of ideas un­
restricted by the kind of formal and informal trappings that typi­
cally narrow the engagement. 
The eight submissions to this publication of the Law Review 
reflect the divergent topics that Illich managed to reflect upon in his 
life’s works.  The topics include discussion of prisons,13 education,14 
family law structures,15 privatization of welfare services16 and its 
impact on labor consciousness,17 media,18 and the rule of law.19 
The pieces speak for themselves and need no elaboration here. 
What may require some elaboration is the magic of the day en­
hanced by the presence in the audience of many Illich students and 
students of Illich students.  It was their presence and contributions 
to the discussion that brought to life the power of the message 
brought by Ivan Illich. 
While there are many unifying themes among Illich’s works, 
one that entranced me was the idea that the very institutions cre­
ated to secure a range of outcome (schools created for education;20 
12. IVAN ILLICH, LIMITS TO MEDICINE: MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION 
OF HEALTH (Marion Boyars 2002) (1975) [hereinafter ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS]. 
13. Giovanna Shay, Illich (via Cayley) on Prisons, 34 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 351 
(2012). 
14. Erin E. Buzuvis, Illich, Education, and The Wire, 34 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 
363 (2012); Jared Gibbs, “For Tomorrow Will Worry About Itself”: Ivan Illich’s 
Deschooling Society and the Rediscovery of Hope, 34 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 381 
(2012). 
15. Martha M. Ertman, Exchange as a Cornerstone of Families, 34 W. NEW. ENG. 
L. REV. 405 (2012). 
16. Bridgette Baldwin, Shadow Works and Shadow Markets: How Privatization of 
Welfare Services Produces an Alternative Market, 34 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 445 (2012). 
17. Davarian L. Baldwin, From Wisconsin to Egypt and Back Again: A Comment 
on Bridgette Baldwin’s Analysis of the Shadow Work Thesis, 34 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 
475 (2012). 
18. Akilah N. Folami, Deschooling the News Media – Democratizing Civic Dis­
course, 34 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 489 (2012). 
19. Bruce Miller, The Place of Law in Ivan Illich’s View of Social Transformation, 
34 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 507 (2012). 
20. ILLICH, DESCHOOLING, supra note 11. 
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348 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:341 
medical systems for maintaining health;21 and technology designed 
to maintain communication and connection22), turn out to be the 
precise mechanisms for undermining the goals sought to be 
achieved.  Re-empowering the individuals to make personal choices 
and create genuine societal engagement in the problems is among 
the solutions to the dilemma created by the societal problems Illich 
highlights.  So, for example, in Deschooling Society, Illich writes 
that schools disempower students and destroy their ability to 
learn.23  Illich’s critique also extends to the academy’s exclusive ag­
grandizement of its own abilities diminishing the capacity of faculty 
within them to generate ideas.24 
In Illich’s critique of schools and vast educational institutions, 
he presages the invention of the Internet.  Consider the following 
description whereby Illich explains how those with knowledge can 
be matched with those who seek it as a proposal for the substitution 
of schools with “learning webs.” 
A student who has picked up Greek before her vacation would 
like to discuss in Greek Cretan politics when she returns.  A 
Mexican in New York wants to find other readers of the paper 
Siempre—or of “Los Agachados,” the most popular comic book. 
Somebody else wants to meet peers who, like himself, would like 
to increase their interest in the work of James Baldwin or of 
Bolivar. 
The operation of a peer-matching network would be simple. 
The user would identify himself by name and address and de­
scribe the activity for which he sought a peer.  A computer would 
21. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS, supra note 12. 
22. IVAN ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY (Harper & Row 1973). 
23. In his criticism of institutional schooling, Illich states: 
Many students, especially those who are poor, intuitively know what the 
schools do for them.  They school them to confuse process and substance. 
Once these become blurred, a new logic is assumed: the more treatment there 
is, the better the results; or, escalation leads to success. The pupil is thereby 
“schooled” to confuse teaching with learning, grade advancement with educa­
tion, a diploma with competence, and fluency with the ability to say something 
new.  His imagination is “schooled” to accept service in place of value.  Medi­
cal treatment is mistaken for health care, social work for the improvement of 
community life, police protection for safety, military poise for national secur­
ity, the rat race for productive work.  Health, learning, dignity, independence, 
and creative endeavor are defined as little more than the performance of the 
institutions which claim to serve those ends, and their improvement is made to 
depend on allocating more resources to the management of hospitals, schools, 
and other agencies in question. 
ILLICH, DESCHOOLING, supra note 11, at 1. 
24. See generally id. at 51-71. 
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349 2012] FOREWORD 
send him back the names and addresses of all those who had in­
serted the same description.  It is amazing that such a simple util­
ity has never been used on a broad scale for publicly valued 
activity. 
In its most rudimentary form, communication between client 
and computer could be established by return mail.  In big cities 
typewriter terminals could provide instantaneous responses. The 
only way to retrieve a name and address from the computer 
would be to list an activity for which a peer was sought.  People 
using the system would become known only to their potential 
peers. 
A complement to the computer could be a network of bulle­
tin boards and classified newspaper ads, listing the activities for 
which the computer could not produce a match.  No names 
would have to be given.  Interested readers would then introduce 
their names into the system.  A publicly supported peer-match 
network might be the only way to guarantee the right of free as­
sembly and to train people in the exercise of this most fundamen­
tal civic activity.25 
If such a learning web sounds familiar, it should. The learning 
web, described by Illich in 1971, sounds remarkably similar to many 
websites currently accessible on the Internet where anyone may use 
just the kind of “typewriter terminal” that Illich describes to make 
the peer match he envisions. 
Illich’s learning webs seem, at the same time, to stand in stark 
contrast to an academic conference that, in Illich’s framework, po­
tentially threatens to undermine the education and engagement in 
ideas that it seeks to create in part because of the passiveness that 
the event potentially develops in the listener.  As Illich explains: 
[t]o deschool means to abolish the power of one person to oblige 
another person to attend a meeting.  It also means recognizing 
the right of any person, of any age or sex, to call a meeting. This 
right has been drastically diminished by the institutionalization of 
meetings.  “Meeting” originally referred to the result of an indi­
vidual’s act of gathering.  Now it refers to the institutional prod­
uct of some agency.26 
As it turns out, the organizers of the Illich Symposium unwit­
tingly created a conference in the spirit of Ivan Illich that left un­
restricted the topics we addressed and, as importantly, left 
unrestricted the persons who could attend and participate in the 
25. Id. at 93. 
26. Id. at 94. 
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engagement of Illich’s ideas.  What resulted was a daylong confer­
ence of ideas that invited the engagement of those who joined. The 
students of Illich and students of students of Illich shared with those 
of us who had not studied at his side, his passion for ideas, his in­
sights, and his invitation for anyone with or without formal educa­
tion and training to challenge the existing social structures that 
diminish the sense of agency each of us have within it. The lunc­
htime discussions reacting to the papers and riffing off of the topics 
discussed were as rich and rewarding as the presentation of the pa­
pers itself. 
The Symposium began as a day focused on the works of Illich. 
It ended up being one that celebrated Ivan. For those of us whose 
only introduction to him was his books and the critiques of his life 
work, it was eye opening to engage with those who studied with him 
and traveled with him on his life’s journey.  Hopefully, this Sympo­
sium Issue gives some glimpse into the magic of that day. 
